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1 Introduction
In this paper I challenge the existing literature that claims that strongly biased technology is necessary to
observe a simultaneous increase in the skill supply and in the skill premium. Their joint increase throughout
the past few decades is well-documented1 and extensively researched. Theoretical explanations for this
phenomenon either treat the increase in the supply of high-skilled labour or the increase in the skill-bias
of technology as exogenous. When both are treated as endogenous, the skill bias of technology and the
skill supply depend positively on each other. This positive dependence is crucial in understanding that the
joint increase of these two variables can emerge during the transition to the steady state, independent of
the strength of the bias in technology.
I present a model where both the relative technology and the relative supply of high-skilled labour is
endogenous. I show that in such a framework the supply of high-skilled workers and the relative quality
in the high-skilled sector change in the same direction during the transition to the steady state. I also
characterise conditions under which the transition path to the steady state features an increase in the supply
of skills and a parallel increase in the relative wages of high-skilled workers.
In the model technological progress is driven by profit oriented R&D firms, where profits are increasing
in the amount of labour that is able to use these technologies. Hence when the relative supply of labour in
one sector increases, the relative profitability of investing into that sector increases as well, thereby increas-
ing the relative technology in that sector. This is referred to as the bias of technology: when a factor becomes
more abundant, technology endogenously becomes more biased towards that factor. If this bias is large
enough, then the increase in the relative technology more than offsets the negative effect of the higher rel-
ative supply, and the relative factor price rises in the long-run. This is termed strong bias of technology. On
the other hand, if the effect of the increase in the relative technology is not large enough, then the relative
factor price decreases, and technology displays a weak bias.
The supply of labour is determined by individual choices: everyone whose cost of education does not
exceed the lifetime gains from working as high-skilled rather than low-skilled, acquires education, and
becomes high-skilled. In such a setup, if the relative technology increases in the high-skilled sector, then the
skill premium increases, thereby increasing the incentives to acquire education, and educational attainment
increases.
It is a well-known fact that the supply of college graduates has been continuously increasing over the
past few decades.2 Human capital accumulation takes several generations, even if technology is fixed.
However, in an environment where technology and human capital are evolving jointly, the transition pro-
cess potentially takes longer, as both the skill supply and the technology adjusts more slowly. In this model,
1For example ?, ?, ?, ?, ? ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, Goldin and Katz (2007 and 2008).
2See for example ?.
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since I allow the supply of the different types of labour to be endogenous, it is natural to consider an econ-
omy that is on the transition path towards its steady state. I numerically map the dependence of this path on
the initial values of relative quality and relative supply. I find that there is a set of initial values from which
the transition features a continuously increasing supply of high-skilled workers, increasing relative quality
and increasing skill premium. This feature persists even if the elasticity of substitution is low between the
two sectors, although the set of such initial values shrinks.
There are two main strands of literature that relate to this paper. The first strand is based on an ex-
ogenous technological progress, and the supply of high- and low-skilled labour adjusts endogenously. ?
models the effects of skill-biased technological revolutions, where learning to use new machines is more
costly than old ones. In such a scenario, new technologies are adopted slowly, there is a gradual shift of
skills to new technologies and the skill premium increases. ? allows for endogenous skill formation in
an overlapping generations model, with worker heterogeneity in ability. He explores the effects of an ex-
ogenous skill-biased technological shock on educational attainment, and finds that the slow adjustment
in the supply of educated labour can result in a nonmonotonic pattern of the skill premium. His model,
similarly to mine, features a slow adjustment in human capital, which is driven by the optimal educational
choices of consecutive cohorts. ? develop a model where an increase in the rate of technological progress
increases the returns to education. In such a context, similarly to the paper here, a feedback mechanism
arises: with a higher supply of human capital, the rate of technological progress increases, and a higher rate
of technological progress induces more human capital accumulation. The feedback works through a very
different channel: it works through easier R&D and not more profitable. ? develop a general equilibrium
model with endogenous skill formation, physical capital accumulation, and heterogeneous human capital
to explain rising wage inequality. In this framework they find that skill-biased technical change explains
the patterns of skill premium and overall inequality rather well.
The second strand takes the path of high-and low-skilled labour as given, while technological progress
is endogenous. The most closely related papers are Acemoglu (1998 and 2002) and ?, which study a model
similar to the one presented here, and consider an exogenous increase in the supply of high-skilled labour.
If the elasticity of substitution between the output of the different types of labour is sufficiently high, then
the skill premium increases in the long run. ? studies the equilibrium bias of technology in a more general
context and shows that if technologies are factor-augmenting, then the increase in the supply of a factor
induces technical change to be relatively biased towards that factor. The condition under which this rel-
ative bias is strong enough to offset the price effect of increased supply is a sufficiently high elasticity of
substitution between the different factors of production.
2
2 The model
The model is along the lines of the model in paper 1. There are two differences: there is no minimum
wage, and individuals are only heterogeneous in their cost of acquiring education. The structure of this
section follows the structure in the previous paper. I begin by describing the model’s production technolo-
gies, the R&D sector, the demographic structure and educational choices. Next I define the decentralised
equilibrium, I analyse the balanced growth path, and finally, I analyse the transitional dynamics.
2.1 Overview
Time is infinite and discrete, indexed by t = 0, 1, 2... The economy is populated by a continuum of indi-
viduals who survive from one period to the next with probability λ, and in every period a new generation
of measure 1− λ is born. Individuals are heterogeneous in their cost of acquiring education.
In the first period of his life every individual has to decide whether to acquire education or not, with the
cost of education varying across individuals. Those who acquire education become high-skilled. Those
who opt out from education remain low-skilled. Workers with high and low skills perform different
tasks, are employed in different occupations, and produce different goods. The high-skilled sector in-
cludes skill-intensive occupations and production using high-skilled labour, while the low-skilled sector
includes labour-intensive occupations and production using low-skilled labour. In equilibrium working in
the high-skilled sector provides higher wages.
There is a unique final good in this economy, which is used for consumption, the production of ma-
chines, and as an investment in R&D. It is produced by combining the two types of intermediate goods:
one produced by the low- and the other by the high-skilled workers. Intermediate goods are produced in a
perfectly competitive environment by the relevant labour and the machines developed for them.
Technological progress takes the form of quality improvements of machines that complement a specific
type of labour, either high- or low-skilled. R&D firms can invest in developing new, higher quality ma-
chines. Innovators own a patent for machines and enjoy monopoly profits until it is replaced by a higher
quality machine. There is free entry into the R&D sector, and more investment will be allocated to develop-
ing machines that are complementary with the more abundant labour type.
The economy is in a decentralised equilibrium at all times: all firms maximise their profits – either in
perfect competition or as a monopoly – and individuals make educational decisions to maximise their life-
time income. I analyse how the distribution of costs and the characteristics of the production function and
the R&D process affect the steady state and the transitional dynamics within this equilibrium framework.
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2.2 Production
The production side of the model is exactly the same as in paper 1. It is a two-sector endogenous
growth model, where technological advances feature a market size effect, by which more R&D investment is
allocated to develop machines complementary to the more abundant factor.
2.2.1 Final and intermediate goods
There is a unique final good, which is produced in perfect competition by combining the two interme-
diate goods:
Y =
(
(Y l)ρ + γ(Y h)ρ
) 1
ρ ,
where Yl and Y h is the intermediate good produced by the low- and high-skilled workers respectively.
The elasticity of substitution between the two intermediate goods is 1/(1 − ρ), where ρ ≤ 1. In perfect
competition the relative price of the two intermediates is:
p ≡ p
h
pl
= γ
(
Y l
Y h
)1−ρ
. (1)
I normalise the price of the final good to one, hence the price of intermediate goods is:
pl =
(
1 + γp
ρ
ρ−1
) 1−ρ
ρ
, (2)
ph =
(
p
ρ
1−ρ + γ
) 1−ρ
ρ
. (3)
In both sectors intermediate good production is perfectly competitive. To simplify notation I allow a
representative firm:
Y s = As(Ns)β for s = {l, h}, (4)
where β ∈ (0, 1), Ns is the amount of labour employed and As is the level of technology in sector s.
Each machine is sector specific in the sense that exclusively high- or low-skilled workers can operate it
respectively. Firms decide the quantity, xs,j of the machine to use given the supply of labour, Ns, and the
quality of a machine, qs,j . Sector s productivity is given by:
As = 11−β
∫ 1
0
qs,j(xs,j)1−βdj for s ∈ {l, h}.
Industry demand for machine line j of quality qs,j and price χs,j by the perfectly competitive interme-
4
diate good production is:
Xs,j =
(
psqs,j
χs,j
) 1
β
Ns for s = {l, h} and j ∈ [0, 1]. (5)
2.2.2 R&D firms
Investment in R&D stochastically produces innovations. Innovations improve the quality of an existing
line of machine by a fixed factor, q > 1. Innovations follow a Poisson process, with an arrival rate for firm k
that invested zjk on line j is ηz
j
k. If total investments on line j is z
j ≡∑k zjk, the economy wide arrival rate
of innovations in line j is ηzj . The probability of an innovation in line j in one period is (1 − e−ηzj ). The
probability that the innovation is performed by firm k is (1 − e−ηzj )zjk/zj . Investing zjk units in R&D costs
Bqzjk in terms of final good, therefore a lowerB implies less expensive innovation. There are two important
things to note: one is that the probability of success is increasing and concave in total investment, zj , the
other is that the cost of investment is increasing in the quality of the machine line. Due to the first feature
there exists an interior solution, while due to the second one a steady state exists. There is free entry into
the R&D sector.
Successful R&D firms become the monopolist owners of the machine they patented. As in paper 1, if
quality improvements are sufficiently large, then in equilibrium only the best quality of any machine is sold
at its monopoly price. I assume that this condition applies, hence the price of the leading vintage in line j
and sector s with quality q is:
χs,j = q1−β for s = {l, h} and j ∈ [0, 1].
The per period profit of the owner of the leading vintage using monopoly pricing and industry demand
(5) can be expressed as:
pis,j = qs,jβ(1− β) 1−ββ (ps) 1βNs for s = {l, h} and j ∈ [0, 1]. (6)
The profit in each period is increasing in the price of the intermediate good, ps, in the quality of the
machine, qs,j , and in the amount of labour that can use the machine, Ns. The value of owning the leading
vintage is the expected discounted value of all future profits, and can be expressed recursively as:
V j,st (q) = pi
j,s
t (q) +
1
1+r (e
−ηzj,st (q))V j,st+1(q) for s = {l, h} and j ∈ [0, 1]. (7)
Where zj,st (q) is the total R&D spending on line j in sector s of current quality q at time t, and
1
1+rV
j,s
t+1(q)
is the present value of owning the leading vintage of quality q in line j and sector s in period t + 1. The
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probability that quality q remains the leading vintage in line j in period t+ 1 is e−ηz
j,s
t (q).
Due to free entry into the R&D sector all profit opportunities are exhausted. Therefore for each firm the
expected return from R&D investment has to equal its cost:
Et(V
s,j
t+1(q
s,j
t ))
1+r (1− e−ηz
j,s
t (q
s,j
t ))
zj,sk
zj,st (q
s,j
t )
= Bqs,jt z
j,s
k for s = {l, h} and j ∈ [0, 1]. (8)
In equilibrium, only the total amount of R&D spending targeted at improving line j in sector s is deter-
mined, since both the expected return and the costs are proportional to the R&D investment of firm k.
2.2.3 Technology and prices
The equilibrium production of intermediate goods given monopoly pricing is:
Y st = (1− β)
1−2β
β (pst )
1−β
β NstQ
s
t for s = {l, h}, (9)
where Qst =
∫ 1
0
qj,st dj is the average quality of the leading vintages in sector s. This evolves according to the
R&D investments targeted at improving the machine in sector s:
Qst+1 =
∫ 1
0
qj,st
(
(1− e−ηzj,st (qj,st ))q +
(
e−ηz
j,s
t (q
j,s
t )
))
dj for s = {l, h}. (10)
The average quality in sector s grows at rate:
gst+1 =
Qst+1
Qst
for s = {l, h}.
I denote the relative average quality or relative technology by Qt ≡ Q
h
t
Qlt
. This evolves according to:
Qt+1 =
ght+1
glt+1
Qht
Qlt
=
ght+1
glt+1
Qt. (11)
The relative prices of intermediates can be expressed by combining (9) with (1):
pt = γ
β
(1−(1−β)ρ)
(
Qht
Qlt
Nht
N lt
)− (1−ρ)β
(1−(1−β)ρ)
. (12)
The relative price is decreasing in the relative supply of high-skilled labour and in the relative quality of
the machines used by high-skilled workers. This is because if the relative share of the high-skilled or the
relative quality of the machines that complement them increases, then the production of the high-skilled
sector increases compared to the production of the low-skilled sector. This leads to a fall in the relative
price.
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2.3 Labour supply
Individuals are heterogeneous in their cost of acquiring education, c. The total cost of acquiring ed-
ucation is cwht , where wht is the high-skilled wage in period t, and c is the idiosyncratic cost drawn from
the time invariant distribution of education costs, f(c). The crucial part of the assumption is that the cost
is proportional to one of the wage rates in the economy, without this assumption the economy would not
have a steady state.3 This assumption is reasonable: the cost of education is partly a time cost, thereby in-
volving foregone earnings, moreover the tuition fees and other expenses incurred while studying are likely
to depend on the wage rates in the economy as well.
The demographics follow the perpetual youth model: every period a new generation of mass 1 − λ is
born, while the probability of surviving from period t to t + 1 is λ. Hence both the size of the population
and the distribution of costs are constant over time.
In the first period of his life each individual decides whether to acquire education, those born in period t
can enrol to study in and only in period t. Acquiring education involves a cost cwht , where c is idiosyncratic,
determined at birth and the total cost is paid upon enrollment into education. Individuals who complete
education become high-skilled, work in the high-skilled sector and earn wage wht in period t. Those who
choose not to acquire education, work as low-skilled for wage wlt in period t.
Monopoly pricing and the industry demand for machines implies a wage:
wst = β(1− β)
1−2β
β (pst )
1
βQst for s = {l, h}. (13)
The wage in sector s is increasing in the price of intermediate good s and the average quality in sector
s. Individuals choose their education level to maximise the present value of their expected lifetime utility:
max
e(c)t
Et
∞∑
j=0
(
λ
1 + r
)j
ut+j ,
where ut+j is their consumption of the final good, λ is the probability of staying alive until the next period,
r is the discount rate, which is also the interest rate due to linear utility. Since utility is linear, lifetime
utility is increasing in lifetime earnings. Therefore individuals make educational decisions to maximise the
expected present value of lifetime income.
LetWht (c) denote the expected present value of lifetime income of an individual with cost c born in
3If the steady state features growth, wages grow, hence if the costs of education remain the same, more and more people would
have an incentive to acquire education.
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period t if high-skilled, andWlt(c) denote the same if low-skilled. The optimal decision is:
e(c)t =
 1 if Wht (c) ≥Wlt(c),0 if Wht (c) <Wlt(c), (14)
where e(c)t = 1 if the individual acquires education and e(c)t = 0 otherwise.
The lifetime earnings of an educated individual can be expressed as:
Wht (c) =
∞∑
s=0
(
λ
1 + r
)s
wht+s − wht c. (15)
The lifetime earnings of a high-skilled individual are decreasing in his cost of acquiring education c.
Whereas the lifetime earnings of a low-skilled individual are unaffected by the costs of education:
Wlt(c) =
∞∑
s=0
(
λ
1 + r
)s
wlt+s. (16)
Education is worth the investment for an individual with cost c if Wht (c) > W lt (c). This requires that the
wage for high-skilled is higher than for low-skilled workers. Hence the following remark,
Remark 1. To have high-skilled individuals in a generation born in period t, there has to be at least one period s ≥ t,
such that the wage is higher for the high-skilled than for the low-skilled: wls < whs .
The only reason for acquiring education is the skill premium, a higher wage in the high- than in the low-
skilled sector. Using the relative price of intermediates, (12) and the wage, (13), the skill premium can be
expressed as:
wht
wlt
= γ
1
1−(1−β)ρ
(
Qht
Qlt
)1− 1−ρ
1−(1−β)ρ (Nht
N lt
)− 1−ρ
1−(1−β)ρ
. (17)
Education increases workers’ wages potentially through three channels: γ, Qht /Qlt and Nht /N lt . The first
two increases the skill premium, as they imply either a higher contribution of high-skilled intermediates to
the final good (γ), or better quality machines in the high-skilled sector (Qht /Qlt). The last term decreases the
skill premium, as there are decreasing returns in production.
The labour supply aggregates Nht and N lt are the total amount of high- and low-skilled labour available
in period t:
Nht = (1− λ)
∞∑
j=0
λj
∫
c
f(c)e(c)(t−j)dc, (18)
N lt = (1− λ)
∞∑
j=0
λj
∫
c
f(c)(1− e(c)(t−j))dc = 1−Nht . (19)
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3 Equilibrium
All firms maximise profits and all individuals maximise their lifetime utility at all times, that is the
economy is in a decentralised equilibrium.
Definition 1. A decentralised equilibrium is a sequence of optimal education decisions {e(c)t}∞t=0, labour sup-
plies {Nht , N lt}∞t=0, discounted present values of expected lifetime income {Wht ,Wlt}∞t=0, intermediate good prices
{pht , plt}∞t=0, average qualities {Qht , Qlt}∞t=0, investments into R&D {zj,ht , zj,lt }∞t=0 and values of owning the lead-
ing vintage {V j,ht , V j,lt }∞t=0 for all lines j ∈ [0, 1], where {Qh0 , Ql0, Nh0 , N l0}, such that the following conditions are
satisfied:
1. the labour supplies satisfy (18) and (19);
2. lifetime earnings are as in (15) and (16);
3. the average quality in sector s evolves according to (10);
4. total R&D investment zj,st satisfies (8) for all t ≥ 0 and all j ∈ [0, 1];
5. the sequence {V j,st }∞t=0 satisfies (7);
6. the price sequence {pht , plt}∞t=0 satisfies (2) and the relative price, pt satisfies (12);
7. the optimal education decisions, {e(c)t}∞t=0 are as in (14).
3.1 Steady state
In this section I identify the steady states or balanced growth paths (BGP) of this economy, which are
decentralised equilibria, where all variables are constant or grow at a constant rate. The solution of the
steady state follows that in paper 1, here I present a more informal discussion.
In the steady state the total R&D spending on all lines within a sector are equal, zj,s∗ = zs∗ for j ∈ [0, 1]
and zs∗ is given by:
β(1− β) 1−ββ (ps∗) 1βNs∗ = Bzs∗ (1+r−e−ηz
s∗
)
1−e−ηzs∗ for s = {l, h}. (20)
Hence R&D effort in a sector is increasing in the period profit from machine sales. As discussed earlier,
these profits are increasing in the price of the intermediate, ps∗, and in the amount of labour, Ns∗, which
uses this technology.
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Relative quality, Q∗, has to be constant along the BGP, which requires equal R&D spending in the two
sectors: zh∗ = zl∗ = z∗. From (20) this holds if:
p∗ =
ph∗
pl∗
=
(
Nh∗
N l∗
)−β
. (21)
The relative quality in the steady state can be expressed by combining the relative price (1),(21) with the
intermediate output (9):
Q∗ =
Qh∗
Ql∗
= γ
1
1−ρ
(
Nh∗
N l∗
) βρ
1−ρ
. (22)
Since the skill premium depends on the relative quality and the relative price, the above two equations
are key in understanding the dynamics of the skill premium. These ratios both depend on the relative
supply of skills, therefore their interaction determines the response of the skill premium to relative skill
supply.
From (22) the relative quality level depends on the relative abundance of the two types of labour along
the balanced growth path. If there are more high-skilled workers, an innovation in the high-skilled sector
is more profitable. Hence technology is more skill-biased – Q∗ is greater, – if the relative supply of skills is
higher.
The relative price of intermediate depends negatively on the relative supply of high-skilled workers
(from (21)). Intuitively, more high-skilled workers and better technologies leads to more high-skilled in-
termediate production, which lowers the relative price of the intermediate. Moreover, since more R&D is
directed towards the larger sector (from (22)), more high-skilled workers implies a higher relative quality,
Q∗.
Along the steady state, technological change is not biased towards either sector, since both sectors are
growing at the same rate, implying that the skill-bias of technology is constant.
The skill premium using (17), (22) and (21) can be expressed as:
wh∗t
wl∗t
=
(
ph∗
pl∗
) 1
β Qh∗t
Ql∗t
= γ
1
1−ρ
(
Nh∗
N l∗
) βρ
1−ρ−1
. (23)
The skill premium depends on two components: the relative price and the relative quality. Since the relative
price depends negatively, while the relative quality depends positively on the relative supply of skilled
workers, the net effect depends on which influences the wages more.
If the two intermediates are highly substitutable (ρ is higher), the price effect is smaller and is dominated
by the effect of relative quality. On the other hand, if the elasticity of substitution is low (low ρ), the price
effect is stronger than the quality effect in the steady state.
For sufficiently high ρs (if (βρ)/(1−ρ)−1 > 0) the skill premium is an increasing function of the relative
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supply of skills. In this case, the increase in relative quality more than compensates for the decrease in
relative price. This is what ? termed as strong relative bias in technology, as increase in the relative supply
of skills increases the skill premium. On the other hand if (βρ)/(1 − ρ) − 1 < 0 then the skill premium is
decreasing in the relative supply, and technology displays weak relative bias: the technology effect does not
compensate for the price effect.
The skill premium is constant in the steady state (from (23)), and from Remark 1 the skill premium has
to be greater than one in at least one period. This implies that wh∗t > wl∗t for all t ≥ 0.
Result 1. Every individual born in period t acquires education if his cost c < c∗, where c∗ is the cutoff cost implicitly
defined by:
c∗ =
1− wl∗
wh∗
1− g∗λ1+r
. (24)
Proof. Combining (14) with (15) and (16), implies that the condition for acquiring education is:
∞∑
s=0
(
λ
1 + r
)s
wh∗t+s −
∞∑
s=0
(
λ
1 + r
)s
wl∗t+s ≥ wh∗t c.
This shows that the optimal education decision is equivalent to a threshold time cost, c∗t . Using the fact that
wages in both sectors grow at a constant rate g∗, and that the skill premium, wh∗t /wl∗t is constant, c∗t = c∗ is
constant and given by (24).
The supply of high-skilled workers using the previous result and (18) can be expressed as:
Nh∗ = F (c∗) = F
(
1− wl∗
wh∗
1− g∗λ1+r
)
, (25)
where F (·) is the cumulative distribution function of the cost of acquiring education. The threshold cost
for acquiring education and consequently the fraction of high-skilled workers depends positively on the
skill premium and on the growth rate of the average qualities. The threshold is increasing in the skill
premium, since a higher skill premium implies a greater per period gain from working as high-skilled. The
growth rate of wages also increases the threshold cost; if wages grow at a higher rate, then for a given skill
premium, future gains are greater.
The growth rate of the economy depends on the amount of R&D spending, z∗, which can be expressed
as (using (2) and (21)):
Bz∗
(1 + r − e−ηz∗)
1− e−ηz∗ = β(1− β)
1−β
β
(
γNh∗
βρ
1−ρ +N l∗
βρ
1−ρ
) 1−ρ
βρ
. (26)
The right hand side is the steady state per period profit from owning the leading vintage normalised by
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the quality of the vintage. The profit is increasing in both Nh∗ and N l∗. If the labour supply increases, then
any unit of investment into R&D has a higher expected return, since there are more people who are able to
use it. The left hand side is increasing in z∗.4 This implies that the steady state R&D spending, and hence
the steady state growth rate is increasing in the labour supplies. The growth rate of the economy is given
by:
g∗ = 1 + (q − 1)(1− e−ηz∗). (27)
This completes the identification of the steady state. The cutoff cost for acquiring education determines
Nh∗. In turn, the supply of high-skilled labour, Nh∗, determines every other variable in the economy in the
steady state. From (26) Nh∗ determines the optimal investment into R&D, z∗. This pins down the growth
rate, g∗, through (27). The supply of high-skilled workers also determines the skill premium, wh∗/wl∗,
through (23). On the other hand, these variables (wh∗/wl∗ and g∗) pin down the steady state cutoff cost for
acquiring education, c∗, which pins down the level of Nh∗ through (25). The possible steady state high-
skilled labour supplies of the economy are thus the fixed points of the function F (h(·)), and the steady state
of the economy is fully characterised by the supply of high-skilled labour, Nh∗:
Nh∗ = F (h(Nh∗)), where (28)
h(x) ≡ 1−
wl∗
wh∗ (x)
1− g∗(x)λ1+r
. (29)
The function h : (0, 1) → R is defined as the optimal cutoff value c∗ for a given supply of high-skilled
workersNh, where the skill premium is given by (23), and the growth rate is given by (27). The steady state
of the economy is the fixed point of function F (h(Nh)), as shown in Figure 1.
The panel on the left shows the case of a strongly biased technology, while the panel on the right shows a
weakly biased technology. Whether F (h(Nh)) is increasing or decreasing inNh depends on whether h(Nh)
increases or decreases in Nh. The optimal c∗ depends on Nh through the growth rate, g, and through the
skill premium, wh/wl. Hence the sign of h′(Nh) depends on the net effect from these two channels.
4To see this, take the derivative:
∂z∗
(
1 + r
1−e−ηz∗
)
∂z∗
= 1 +
z∗
1− e−ηz∗
(
1− rηz
∗e−ηz
∗
1− e−ηz∗
)
.
A sufficient condition for this derivative to be positive is 1− rηz∗e−ηz
∗
1−e−ηz∗ ≥ 0. This can be rearranged to the following inequality:
1 ≥ e−ηz∗ (1 + rηz∗).
For z∗ = 0 this holds with equality, while the right hand side is decreasing in z∗. QED
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Figure 1: Steady states
The effect of Nh on the growth rate depends on the elasticity of substitution between the two interme-
diate goods. If the elasticity of substitution is not too high (ρ < 1/(1+β)), then the growth rate is increasing
until it reaches its maximum at Nh = 1/(1 + γ
1−ρ
βρ−(1−ρ) ), and then it decreases as Nh increases further. The
intuition for this result is that when the elasticity is low, then similar amounts are required from the two
goods, and hence it is not good to specialise in neither high- nor low-skilled intermediates. On the other
hand, if the elasticity of substitution is higher (ρ > 1/(1 + β)), then the two goods can be easily substi-
tuted, and the best is to specialise in either high- or low-skilled intermediate production. In this case the
growth rate is decreasing until Nh = 1/(1 + γ
1−ρ
βρ−(1−ρ) ), where the growth rate is the lowest, and then starts
increasing as Nh increases further.
The elasticity of substitution also determines the effect of Nh on the skill premium. Recall that, with
an increase in the (relative) supply of high-skilled labour the steady state relative quality increases (from
equation (22)), since when a larger labour force works in a sector, the demand for machines in that sector,
and hence profits on machines increases. However, parallel to the increase in the relative quality, the relative
price of the intermediate good produced by the high-skilled workers decreases, as the supply of high-skilled
intermediates increases. The effect of an increase in Nh on the skill premium depends on the strength of
these two responses. As discussed earlier, when the two intermediates are easily substitutable, ρ > 1/(1+β),
then the effect of the relative quality dominates, and the technology is strongly biased. In this case the skill
premium is increasing in Nh. On the other hand, when the two intermediates cannot be substituted that
easily, ρ < 1/(1 + β), then the relative price effect dominates, and technology is weakly biased. The skill
premium decreases with Nh in such cases.
For most parameter values, however, the effect of Nh on the growth rate is relatively small, and is
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dominated by the effect of Nh on the skill premium. This implies that when technology is strongly biased,
the skill premium is increasing in the supply of high-skilled workers, and h′(Nh) > 0, and hence the
F (h(Nh)) curve is upward sloping. Conversely, when technology is weakly biased, the skill premium is
decreasing in the supply of high-skilled workers, then h′(Nh) < 0 and the F (h(Nh)) curve is downward
sloping.
In the case of a weakly biased technology there is maximum one steady state, depicted in the right panel
of Figure 1 by Nh∗. The graph suggests that this steady state is stable, as for high-skilled labour supplies
lower than Nh∗, a higher fraction of the new cohort would acquire skills than Nh∗, and the converse is
true for high-skilled labour supplies higher than Nh∗. However, the conditions that govern F (h(Nh)) only
hold in the steady state, so to fully ascertain the stability of the steady state, an analysis of the transitional
dynamics is required.
In the case of a strongly biased technology multiple steady states are possible, as depicted in the left
panel of Figure 1 by Nh∗1 and Nh∗2 . The graph suggests, that steady states where F (h(Nh)) crosses the 45
degree line from below are unstable (like Nh∗1 ), whereas the steady states where it crosses it from above are
stable (like Nh∗2 ).
4 Comparative dynamics
In this section I analyse the characteristics of the transition path. I look at two types of transitions. In
the first section, I do not assume that the economy is in a steady state, but I analyse the transition path
from different initial points to the steady state. In the second, I assume that the economy is in the steady
state, introduce a change in of the parameters, and follow the transition path to the new steady state. In
both cases, throughout the transition the economy is in a decentralised equilibrium, and the transitional
dynamics are governed by the initial value of the state variables and the final steady state. I calculate the
transition paths using second order approximation of the decentralised equilibrium around the final steady
state.5
4.1 Initial values
Available data shows that the supply of high-skilled workers and the educational attainment of consecu-
tive cohorts has been steadily increasing over time, however, the growth rate of educational attainment has
significantly slowed down over the last few years.6 This evidence suggests that the developed economies
have been in a transition towards their steady state. Therefore in this section I do not formulate a hypoth-
5See Section B.1 of the Appendix for the equations that have to hold during the transition.
6See for example OECD Factbook 2005-2010, various editions of OECD Education at a Glance.
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esis about a change in steady states. Instead I analyse the dependence of the transition path on the initial
values of the economy.
This analysis shows, that an increasing skill supply, increasing relative quality and increasing skill pre-
mium can arise during the transition to the steady state regardless of whether the technology is strongly or
weakly biased.
I consider two baseline set of parameter values for the steady state, one that features weakly biased
technology, and one that features strongly biased technology.7 I choose the sets of baseline parameters to
provide reasonable steady state values: a final skill supply of 45 percent, a final skill premium of around 40
percent, and an annual growth rate of around 2 percent.8 I analyse the transition path to the steady state
from all possible initial skill supply and relative quality pairs. This exercise shows that the steady state can
be reached with increasing skill supply and increasing skill premium in case of both weakly and strongly
biased technologies.
This is an important result, as it implies that observing increasing relative supplies and increasing rel-
ative wages can be the result of the economy’s normal transition process while building up human cap-
ital. On the one hand, the relative quality depends positively on the supply of skills. On the other, the
skill premium, which determines the change in the skill supply, depends positively on the relative quality.
Therefore, it is not surprising that during the transition the skill supply, the relative quality, and poten-
tially the skill premium increase together. If the economy is not in the steady state, the explanation of this
phenomenon does not require exogenously skill biased technological progress nor a strong, endogenous
bias in technology. Only two conditions are necessary for this to happen. First, the relative quality has to
increase as a response to an increase in the relative supply. If R&D is modeled as a profit driven activity,
and profits are increasing in the demand, then this is a natural result. The second necessary condition is
that the quality in the high-skilled sector is not too high compared to the quality in the low-skilled sector.
If the initial relative quality is also the result of some form of optimization, and the supply of high-skilled
workers is low, then again, this is a natural result of a profit maximizing R&D sector.
Based on numerical solutions to the transition path Figure 2 shows how the type of transition depends
on the initial values.9 TheAOB curve shows the border where the direction of change in the relative quality,
Q, changes. Below the curve, relative quality is increasing, whereas above the curve, relative quality is
decreasing. The left panel in Figure 2 shows a strongly biased technology, while the right panel shows a
7I take β, λ and r to be the same as in the previous paper. The parameter-values are:
ρ γ η q B µ σ β λ r
weak bias 0.5 1.15 0.04 2.08 0.3 1 6 2/3 8/9 1.055
strong bias 0.7 1.15 0.04 2.08 0.16 1 6 2/3 8/9 1.055
8Of course, reasonable is not an easily judgeable concept here, since I assume that none of the advanced economies are in their
steady state yet.
9See Section B.2 of the Appendix for Matlab graphs.
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Figure 2: Phase diagram
weakly biased technology. The AOB curve is much steeper in the left panel, i.e. for higher ρs, indicating
that for low values of Nh, a lower relative quality is desirable if ρ is higher, and the converse is true for
above steady state values of Nh. If the elasticity of substitution is higher, relative prices are less sensitive
to the relative output of the two sectors (see (1)), which translates into less sensitivity of monopolist profits.
Hence, with higher ρ it is less worthwhile to invest into the high-skilled sector if Nh is low, while it is more
worthwhile if Nh is high. Therefore, since the steady state is almost the same in the two cases depicted on
Figure 2, and the AOB curve is bound to be less steep for lower ρs, the relative quality decreases for more
initial values below Nh and for fewer initial values above Nh.
The dashed curveCOD shows the border where the direction of change in the skill supply,Nh, changes.
To the left of the curve, Nh is increasing, while to the right, it is decreasing. Comparing curves COD, which
determine the movement ofNh, the implication is that for a given value ofQ a lower supply of high-skilled
labour is desirable. This can be understood from (17), which shows that for a higher ρ, the skill premium is
more sensitive to the relative quality than to the relative supply of skills. Therefore for a higher ρ with the
same Q a lower Nh is necessary.
The steady state, denoted by O, is at the intersection of curves AOB and COD, where neither Q nor Nh
changes. Numerical solutions show that there are only two ways to reach the steady state, O: either from
above right, where both Q and Nh are decreasing, or from below left, where both Q and Nh are increasing.
From the left side of the EOE′ curve, the economy transitions to the steady state from below, whereas from
the right of this curve the economy transitions from above.
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If the economy starts from the area bounded by AOE, then while the economy stays in this area the
relative quality continuously decreases, while the supply of high-skilled workers increases. This is due
to the fact that the initial relative quality is too high compared to the relative supply of skilled workers,
therefore it is more worthwhile to invest in improving the quality in the unskilled sector, leading to a
decline in the relative quality. On the other hand, the skill premium is quite high, therefore the new cohorts
keep acquiring more education than previous ones, and the supply of skills increases.
If the economy starts from the COE′ area, then the supply of skills decreases, while the relative quality
increases as long as the economy stays in this region. Here the relative supply of skills is too high compared
to the relative quality, therefore the new cohorts acquire less education than previous ones, and the supply
of skills decreases. Meanwhile, since the supply of skills is high, the R&D sector focuses investment into
the skilled sector, and the relative quality continuously increases.
From both of these regions, the economy eventually moves into theAOC area. Here, the relative quality
is neither too high, nor too low compared to the supply of skills, and hence both the supply of skills and
the relative quality increase together to the steady state, O.
In the E′OB area the supply of skills is too high compared to the relative quality. Therefore, the new
cohorts acquire less education, and the skill supply decreases, while the R&D sector invests into the high-
skilled sector, and the relative quality increases.
If the economy starts in the EOD region, then the relative quality is too high compared to the supply
of high-skilled workers. Therefore, the relative quality decreases, as there will be more investment into the
unskilled sector, while the supply of skills increases, as the skill premium is high, and new cohorts acquire
more education.
From both theE′OB andEOD area the economy moves into theDOB region, where the relative quality
is neither too high nor too low compared to the supply of skills, and both decrease together to the steady
state, O.
This shows, that if the supply of high-skilled workers approaches its steady state from below, then the
transition path can only feature decreasing relative quality at the beginning of the transition, but as the
economy gets closer to the steady state, then eventually the relative quality increases. Therefore, technolog-
ical change can only be unskill-biased at the beginning of the transition, and it is necessarily skill-biased while
approaching the steady state. On the other hand, if the supply of skills reaches its steady state value from
above, then the relative quality decreases for most of the transition, apart from some of the initial periods.
Thus technological change is unskill-biased for most of the transition. Therefore the skill supply and the
relative quality tend to move together during the transition. This is due to the positive dependence of these
two variables on each other. If the relative quality increases in the future, the skill premium increases as
well, which leads to an increase in the skill supply. If the skill supply increases in the future, then there are
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more gains to be made from investing in high-skilled machines, and hence relative quality increases as well.
Therefore the joint increase of the skill supply and the relative quality should not be surprising. However,
this does not automatically imply that the skill supply and the skill premium should move hand-in-hand
as well.
There are two aspects of the skill premium that are of interest: its change in the short run, and its change
in the long run. The long run change in the skill premium is the change between the initial skill premium
and the final, steady state skill premium. From (23) the skill premium increases in the long run if:
Q0 ≤
(
Nh0
Nh∗
) 1−ρ
βρ
(
1−Nh∗
1−Nh0
) 1−ρ
βρ
Q∗ ≡ s(Nh0 ).
The function s(Nh0 ) is depicted in Figure 3 by the blue curve, and the above inequality implies that if the
initial point is below the blue curve, then the skill premium increases in the long-run. There are two things
to note from this inequality. First, that s(Nh0 ) is upward sloping. If the initial skill supply is higher, the
initial relative quality can be higher, and the skill premium still increases in the long run. The intuition for
this is that the relative supply and the relative quality have opposite effects on the skill premium: while
the former decreases it, the latter increases it, thus leaving it unchanged. Second, that the blue curve in the
strongly biased technology case (left panel) is flatter: for low initial skill supplies it is higher and for high
initial skill supplies it is lower. If ρ is higher, then the effect of the relative quality on the skill premium is
larger, and the effect of the relative supply is lower. Therefore, a very low skill supply does not imply such
a high skill premium if ρ is larger, while a very high skill supply does not imply such a low skill premium.
This implies that for higher ρs the s(Nh0 ) curve is flatter.
In Figure 3 the different shades of gray represent the different paths the skill premium can take through-
out the transition. The two lighter colours represent the initial points from which the skill premium in-
creases in the long-run, while the two darker grays represent the initial points from the skill premium
decreases in the long-run.
The short-run change in the skill premium depends on the magnitude of the change in the relative
quality and the relative supply of skilled workers. From (17), we get:
wht
wlt
wht−1
wlt−1
=
(
Qt
Qt−1
) βρ
1−(1−β)ρ
 N
h
t
N lt
Nht−1
N lt−1

− 1−ρ
1−(1−β)ρ
. (30)
An increase in the relative skill supply reduces the skill premium, while an increase in the relative quality
increases it. The greater the increase in the relative quality compared to the increase in the relative supply,
the more likely it is that the skill premium also increases. From this equation it is easy to see that a higher ρ
makes the skill premium more responsive to changes in the relative quality and less responsive to changes
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Figure 3: The path of the skill premium
in the relative skill supply. Intuitively, this is because for more substitutable intermediates, as the price effect
is smaller, the effect of the relative quality on the skill premium is stronger than the effect of the relative
supply. Hence, when ρ is higher a smaller increase in Q leads to a greater increase in the skill premium.
If the economy is in the DOA area, the relative quality decreases, while the relative supply increases
(from Figure 2). From (30), this leads to an unambiguous decrease in the skill premium. The opposite holds
for an economy that is in the BOC area, leading to an unambiguous increase in the skill premium. This is
depicted by the + and − signs in Figure 3.
In the AOC area both the skill supply and the relative quality is increasing, hence in general, the overall
effect on the skill premium is ambiguous. It is clear, that the closer is the economy to the AO curve, the less
likely it is that the skill premium increases, as the relative quality hardly changes initially at these points.
In the case of strongly biased technologies, as discussed earlier, the skill premium is more responsive to
changes in the relative quality, and less responsive to changes in the relative supply. Therefore, for most
part of the AOC area the skill premium increases (shown in white), and only for a smaller fraction does it
decrease (shown in the lightest gray). The situation is different if the technology is weakly biased. In this
case the skill premium only increases for a smaller part of the AOC area (again shown in white), and for
the rest, the skill premium decreases.
In the case of strongly biased technologies, as the s(Nh0 ) curve is above the AO curve, the skill premium
increases in the long-run for all initial values in area AOC. This implies that even if the skill premium
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decreases initially for economies in the light gray area, the transition takes the economy into the white
region, where the skill premium increases continuously, finally increasing above its original value. If the
technology is weakly biased, then as the s(Nh0 ) curve is below the AO curve, for some values (shown in the
darker gray), the skill premium decreases in the long-run, and for only a smaller set of initial points does it
increase in the long run after an initial decline (lighter gray area).
If the economy is in theDOB area, the change in the skill premium is ambiguous, as both the skill supply
and the relative quality decreases. Again, the closer is the initial point to the OB curve, the more likely it
is that the skill premium initially increases. This is due to the fact that close to the OB curve the change
in the relative quality is small, and hence the decrease in the relative supply can potentially dominate its
effect. In case of strongly biased technologies, from (30), the skill premium is more responsive to changes
in the relative quality. Therefore, the change in the relative supply can dominate the effect of decreasing
technology for a smaller set of initial points (shown in the second darkest gray), and the skill premium
decreases for most values (darkest gray). In case of weakly biased technologies the skill premium increases
for a larger set from the DOB area (shown in light gray), since the skill premium is more responsive to
changes in the supply of high-skilled workers.
Since the s(Nh0 ) curve is below the OB curve for strongly biased technologies, the skill premium de-
creases in the long run for the entire set of initial values in the DOB region, while for a large part of the
DOB area in case of weakly biased technologies the skill premium increases in the long-run (shown in the
lightest gray).
To summarise, the darkest gray represents the area where the skill premium continuously decreases
throughout the entire transition. In this area, the relative quality is much higher than what is profitable
given the current supply of skills and the future decreasing path of skills, therefore the relative quality
decreases drastically, while the relative supply of skills decreases at a slower rate (or even increases from
area EOD) as the skill premium is relatively high. Therefore the skill premium decreases continuously
until it reaches its steady state value. For higher ρs this area is wider, as the skill premium responds more
to changes in the relative quality.
The white areas contain the initial points from where the skill premium continuously increases through-
out the transition. These are points, where the relative quality is low compared to the current supply and
the future increasing path of high-skilled workers. If the sub-optimality of the relative quality is sufficiently
large, then it increases at such a high rate, that it dominates the slowly increasing supply of skilled workers
(or for the initially decreasing supply from area COE′). Therefore from the white area the skill premium
continuously increases until reaching the steady state. Again, this area is wider for higher values of ρ, as
the skill premium is less sensitive to supply effects.
If the initial point is in one of the medium gray areas and Nh0 < Nh∗, then the skill premium initially
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decreases (denoted by the − sign in the area), and then increases until the steady state is reached, whereas
if Nh0 > Nh∗, then it increases initially (denoted by the + sign in the area), and then decreases to the steady
state. This suggests that the stable arm lies in the white area if the initial point is to the left of the EOE′
curve, and it lies in the darkest gray area if the initial point is to the right of the EOE′ curve. 10 If the initial
point is in the second darkest area, then the skill premium decreases compared to its initial value in the
long run. The lightest gray area contains the initial points for which the skill premium increases in the long
run.
In light of this analysis, the fact that the skill supply and the skill premium have been growing together
over the last few decades should not be surprising. The developed economies had to start with a sufficiently
low relative quality in the high-skilled sector, and the skill supply and the skill premium had to increase
together. Moreover, an unexpected increase in Nh, for example due to bigger cohort sizes or other reasons
for enrollment into higher education (for example to avoid the draught), would push the economy towards
the right. This would reduce the skill premium immediately, while possibly shifting the economy into the
white region. An important implication of the joint analysis of skill supply and relative technologies, is that
as ρ decreases, this area shrinks, but it does not disappear. Therefore, the relative bias of technology does
not have to be strong in order to observe increasing skill premium and increasing skill supply.
4.2 Parameters
In this section I consider the dynamic effects of changes in various parameters of the model.11 I analyse
how the steady state changes and the characteristics of the transition path. It is important to note that the
exact path of the transition, as discussed in the previous section, is determined by the region in which the
old steady state falls compared to the new steady state in terms of Figure 3.
The steady state is affected by parameters in two ways. The distribution of education costs affect the
steady state supply of high-skilled workers by changing the function F (·). All other parameters, which are
either connected to the production of goods or to the R&D process affect the steady state via changing the
function h(·).
The effects of the parameters of the R&D process are the most straightforward to assess. These parame-
ters only affect the steady state through their effect on the growth rate. If a change in a parameter increases
the growth rate of the economy, then from equation (1) the steady state gain from working as high-skilled
relative to low-skilled increases. This implies an upward shift in the F (h(Nh)) curve, as h(Nh) increases
for every Nh.
Figure 4 demonstrates the effects of an upward shift of F (h(Nh)) on the steady states. In case of a
10The final increase or decrease in the skill premium is at times hardly noticeable, implying that for most of the transition the
economy stays in one of the medium gray areas.
11The final steady state parameters are the same as in the previous section.
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weakly biased technology, the steady state Nh∗ unambiguously increases. For strongly biased technologies
the situation is more complicated. Steady states where the F (h(Nh)) curve crosses the 45 degree line from
below shift down, while steady states where the F (h(Nh)) curve crosses the 45 degree line from above shift
up. However, the stable steady state is where F (h(Nh)) crosses from above, and in these cases, similarly to
the weakly biased technology case, the stable steady state Nh∗ unambiguously increases.
Parameter η controls the effectiveness of R&D spending (through the Poisson arrival rate of innova-
tions), and q controls the quality improvement per innovation. An increase in either of these parameters
increases the growth rate. Since B is the price of investing one unit into innovation in terms of final good,
B increases the cost of the R&D activity, and hence decreases the equilibrium growth rate. Therefore an
increase in either η or q as well as a decrease in B increases the steady state supply of high-skilled workers
unambiguously regardless of whether the technology is strongly or weakly biased. However, from (23) in
case of a strongly biased technology this unambiguously implies a higher final skill premium, whereas with
a weakly biased technology, this implies a lower final skill premium. Figure 5 shows the transition paths
for a change in the parameter η.12
An increase in η increases the growth rate of the economy immediately, which increases the present
value gain from acquiring education. Therefore there is a jump in the educational attainment of new co-
horts, as can be seen on the top right panel for both types of technology. There is a difference though in
the consequent path of F (c∗t ): in case of a strongly biased technology, it continues to increase, whereas for
weakly biased technologies, it declines after its initial increase. This is due to the differential response of
the skill premium to the increase in the relative supply and relative quality. The initial response of the skill
12Since the transition paths look very similar in case of an increase in q or a decrease in B, I do not include them in the main text,
they can be found in the Section B.3 of the Appendix.
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Figure 5: Change in the R&D parameters
premium in both cases is a decline, as relative quality does not change, while the skill supply increases. In
case of a weakly biased technology, the skill premium continues to decrease, thereby offsetting some of the
increase in the present value gain from acquiring education, whereas in case of a strongly biased technol-
ogy, the skill premium starts to increase, this way further increasing the present value gain from acquiring
education. The skill supply and the relative quality continuously increases for both types of technology,
although the increase is more pronounced in case of a strongly biased technology.
In terms of Figure 2, this implies that the initial steady state was in theAOC region compared to the new
steady state. In the case of strongly biased technologies, based on the path of the skill premium the initial
point fell into the light gray region within AOC in Figure 3, and the economy almost immediately crossed
over to the white region during the transition. In case of a weakly biased technology the skill premium
almost continuously falls, there is just a slight increase before reaching the steady state, thus the initial
point fell into the dark gray region within AOC in Figure 3, and the economy crossed over to the white
region just before reaching the steady state.
The next set of parameters I consider are related to the production of the final good, γ and ρ. First
consider γ, the weight of the high-skilled intermediate in the production of the final good. Intuitively an
increase in this parameter increases the value of the high-skilled intermediate and thus increases the returns
to acquiring education as well. This intuition is supported by equation (23), which shows that an increase
in γ increases the skill premium. At the same time, γ also affects the steady state through its effect on R&D.
From equation (26), an increase in γ increases the returns to investment into R&D, and hence increases the
growth rate.13 Both of these shift the h(·) function up, and therefore an increase in γ has similar effects as
13Note that an increase in γ increases the returns to R&D in both the high- and the low-skilled sector. This is the case, as γ besides
measuring the relative importance of high- and low-skilled intermediates in the production of final good, also measures the absolute
contribution of high-skilled intermediates. An increase in γ increases the final output for any combination of inputs, i.e. it makes
production more efficient.
23
depicted in Figure 4.
Figure 6 shows the transition from the old steady state to the new one in case of an unexpected increase
in γ. An increase in γ immediately increases the skill premium and the growth rate, thereby increasing the
present value gain from acquiring education. This leads to an immediate jump in the education acquisition
of new cohorts (as can be seen on the top right panels). The skill premium (bottom left panels) continues to
increase in both cases, though to a much smaller extent in case of weakly biased technologies. For weakly
biased technologies, the increase in the supply of high-skilled workers and in the relative quality reduces
the skill premium. However, the increase in γ has a direct positive effect on the skill premium by increasing
the weight of the skilled intermediate in the production of the final good (see (23)). Therefore in case of
weakly biased technologies, the overall effect depends on the magnitude of the two opposing effects. In
the example below, the skill premium continues to increase in the weakly biased case, even though to a
smaller extent than in the case of strongly biased technologies.14 In this case both initial steady states fall
into the white region of AOC and hence during the transition the skill supply, the relative quality and the
skill premium all increase together.
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Figure 6: Increase in γ
The effects of ρ on the steady state high-skilled labour supply are more complex. This parameter controls
the elasticity of substitution between the high- and the low-skilled intermediate good. This way, it affects
the lifetime gain from acquiring education through both the growth rate and the skill premium. The growth
rate depends negatively on ρ (from equation (26)), implying that when the intermediate goods are more
substitutable with each other, the growth rate is lower. The responsiveness of the skill premium to the
supply of high-skilled workers depends on the relation between ρ and 1/(1 + β). When ρ = 1/(1 + β),
then the skill premium does not change in response to a change in the supply of high-skilled workers, as
14The strength of the effect of γ on the skill premium through Nh∗ depends on ρ. The closer is ρ to 1/(1 + β), the more likely it is
that the direct effect of γ dominates.
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the price effect and the technology effect exactly offset each other. Thus, the closer is ρ to 1/(1 + β), the
less the steady state skill premium responds to changes in the supply of high-skilled workers (see equation
(23)). Thus, for weakly biased technologies, higher substitutability implies a flatter skill premium, one that
responds less to extreme values ofNh. In case of a weakly biased technology the steady state skill premium
is a decreasing function of the supply of skilled labour. Therefore a higher ρ implies a lower skill premium
for low Nhs and a higher skill premium for high Nhs. Thus, the F (h(Nh)) curve for higher ρs goes below
the one for lower ρs for low values ofNh, and goes above it for high values ofNh. In case of strongly biased
technologies the steady state skill premium is an increasing function of the supply of skilled labour. In this
case a higher elasticity implies a steeper skill premium: one that is lower for low values of Nh and higher
for high values of Nh. The overall effect of a change in ρ thus depends on the other parameter values and
on the magnitude of change. Figure 7 shows the transition path for higher elasticities of substitution, for
cases where the new steady state features a lower supply of high-skilled workers.
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Figure 7: An increase in ρ
The increase in ρ lowers the growth rate, this way reducing the gain from working as high-skilled, and
leading to the downward jump in the educational attainment of new cohorts. This reduces initially the
skill premium, since the supply of skills increases, while technology stays the same. As the skill supply
and relative quality decline throughout the transition, the skill premium increases further for weakly bi-
ased technologies. This leads to a slight increase in the educational attainment of new cohorts. On the
other hand, for strongly biased technologies the skill premium, after its initial increase, decreases below its
original level in the long run. The educational attainment of new cohorts thus continues to decrease. The
initial steady state in the case of the strongly biased technology fell into the darker gray part of the BOE′
region in Figure 3, as the relative quality and the skill premium slightly increase initially, and the economy
crosses over to the dark gray region in DOB at the beginning of the transition. In the case of weakly biased
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technologies, the relative quality continuously declines together with the supply of skills. Therefore the
initial steady state was in the BOE′ region, and the economy crossed over to the darkest gray area of DOB
just before reaching the steady state.
The last parameters to consider are the mean and the variance of the distribution of educational costs.
A distribution with a lower mean, µ, can be represented by the dashed curve in Figure 4, while the higher
mean distribution can be represented by the solid curve. This is due to the fact that in a lower mean
distribution, there is more mass below any given point, than in the higher mean distribution. Hence, for
any present value gain from acquiring education, it is worthwhile for more people to acquire education if
the mean cost is lower. Therefore, the stable steady state with lower mean costs of education features higher
Nh, which is quite intuitive: where education is cheaper more people acquire education in the long run.15
Figure 8 shows the transition after an unexpected drop in the mean cost of education.
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Figure 8: A decline in the mean cost of education, µ
The decline in the mean cost of acquiring education leads to a jump in the educational attainment of new
cohorts, since even with the same gain from working as high-skilled, it is worthwhile for a larger fraction of
the population. The skill premium in both cases decreases initially, as there is a larger supply of high-skilled
workers, while technology does not adjust immediately. The skill premium continues to decline in case of
weakly biased technologies, as the effects of the increase in the relative supply are not compensated by the
increase in the relative quality. Therefore, the educational attainment of consecutive cohorts declines, but
stays above its original level. In case of strongly biased technologies the joint increase in the relative supply
and the relative quality lead to an increase in the skill premium, leading to a continuous increase in the
educational attainment of new cohorts.
Finally I consider is the variance of the cost of education. A higher variance implies that there are more
15In general it is true that if a distribution F first order stochastically dominates distribution G, then G can be represented with the
dashed curve, while F can be represented with the solid curve, and hence the steady state under G has more skilled workers.
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people with low costs, up until the median costs, while for costs above the median there are more people
with higher costs, i.e. fewer people with lower costs. Hence, as long as in the steady state less than half
of the population acquires education, the steady state Nh is higher when the costs of education are more
dispersed. Figure 9 shows the transition path after an increase in the dispersion of the costs of education.
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Figure 9: An increase in the dispersion of the costs of education, σ
As the variance of costs increases, a larger fraction of the new cohort acquires education (as long as the
present value gain is below the median cost). The transition path and the intuition for the adjustment of
the variables is exactly the same as in the case of a lower mean cost of education.
To summarise, for all of the parameter changes considered, the path of the supply of high-skilled work-
ers and the path of the relative quality in the two sectors are similar in case of weakly and strongly biased
technologies. However, the path of the skill premium and of the educational attainment of new cohorts is
dramatically different for all but one parameter change. The only exception is an increase in parameter γ,
where all four variables follow similar paths for the two types of technologies. Except for this case, the skill
premium and the educational attainment of new cohorts always moves in opposite directions. This is due
to the fact that for weakly biased technologies the increasing relative quality compensates less for the neg-
ative effect of the increasing skill supply on the skill premium. Therefore, in most cases the skill premium
decreases if the skill supply is increasing, and hence the incentives of acquiring education are reduced for
newer cohorts. The opposite holds for strongly biased technologies: as the skill premium continuously
increases, the incentives to acquire education increases for newer cohorts.
5 Concluding remarks
In this paper I challenge the view that a strong relative bias in the technology is necessary for the simul-
taneous increase of the skill supply and the skill premium. Assuming, consistently with the data, that the
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developed economies are not in their steady state, and considering explicitly the transition to the steady
state, the model shows that the joint increase in the skill supply and the skill premium can arise regardless
of the bias in the technology.
I propose a model where the direction of technical change and the supply of skilled labour is endoge-
nous. Technological change is driven by R&D firms, which invest more into developing technologies for
bigger markets. Therefore when the supply of high-skilled labour increases, technology becomes more bi-
ased towards high-skilled workers. The increase in the skill-bias of technology increases the skill premium,
however, this is offset to some extent by the negative effect of increasing skill supply on the skill premium.
If the overall effect is an increase in the skill premium, then technology is strongly biased, whereas if the
overall effect is a decline in the skill premium, then technology is weakly biased. On the other hand, the
supply of skilled labour is determined by individual decisions whether to acquire education or not, there-
fore a higher skill premium leads to a larger supply of skilled labour. The positive dependence of these two
variables on each other are crucial in understanding the dynamics.
I analyse the steady state of this model and its dependence on parameter values. This exercise shows,
that for most steady state shifts that arise due to a parameter-change, a strongly biased technology is nec-
essary to observe a long-run increase in both the skill supply and the skill premium.
I conduct a thorough analysis of the transitional dynamics, and its dependence on the initial value of the
skill supply and the relative quality. The analysis shows, that if initially the relative quality is not too high
compared to the supply of high-skilled workers, then the transition can feature a joint continuous increase
in the supply of high-skilled labour and the skill premium. I highlight the importance of transitional dy-
namics by showing that this pattern can emerge independent of whether technology is weakly or strongly
biased.
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A Transitional dynamics
I calculate the transition using second order perturbations, for which all equations have to be defined in
terms of variables that are stationary in the steady state. Two variables are not stationary in the steady state,
the value of owning a leading vintage, and the present value gain from working as high-skilled rather than
low-skilled. The value of owning the leading vintage, V st (q), is proportional to the quality of that machine.
Let vst denote the normalized value of owning the leading vintage in sector s at time t:
vht =
V ht (q)
q v
l
t =
V lt (q)
q .
In the steady state the discounted expected present value of working as high-skilled rather than low-
skilled starting from period t is proportional to the wages in period t, which is proportional to the average
quality. Let ∆t denote the normalized present value gain from acquiring education (normalized by the
current quality in the low-skilled sector):
∆t =
∞∑
j=0
(
λ
1 + r
)j wht+j − wlt+j
Qlt
The transitional path is fully characterized by the initial values Nh0 and Q0 and the following equations:
vst+1 = B
s (1+r)z
s
1−e−ηzst s = l, h
vst = β(1− β)
1−β
β (pst )
1
βNst − e
−ηzst
1+r v
s
t+1 s = l, h
gst+1 = 1 + (q − 1)(1− e−ηz
s
t ) s = l, h
pht =
(
γ + γ
βρ
(1−(1−β)ρ)(1−ρ)
(
Qt
Nht
N lt
)− βρ
(1−(1−β)ρ)
) 1−ρ
ρ
plt =
(
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βρ
(1−(1−β)ρ)(1−ρ)
(
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Nht
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) βρ
(1−(1−β)ρ)
) 1−ρ
ρ
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ght+1
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Qt
∆t = c
∗
tβ(1− β)
1−2β
β (pht )
1
βQt
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(pht )
1
βQt − (plt)
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β
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h
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B Initial values
B.1 dQ = 0 and dNh = 0
The Figure below shows the border where the regions where the state variables are increasing (in black)
and decreasing (in white), the border between the regions is where the state variable stays constant. The
intersection of the two borders is the steady state.
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Figure 10: Phase diagram source
B.2 Short-run and long-run change in the skill premium
The Figure below shows the immediate change in the skill premium and the overall change in the skill
premium for each initial point. As before black indicates an increase and white indicates a decrease.
B.3 Saddle path
The following Figure shows how the entire transition of the skill premium and the relative quality. Black
shows continuous increase, darker gray shows points where there is an overall increase, but the path is not
monotonic, lighter gray shows non-monotonic overall decrease, and white shows continuous decrease.
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Figure 11: Skill premium change source
Since to the left of Nh∗ for most part Q decreases, the fact that Q doesn’t continuously decrease to the
steady state implies that the transition takes the economy into the black region in the top row of Figure 10.
Similarly, for initial points above Nh there is a large part where Q initially increases, but does not increase
until the steady state, as the area is in the darker gray. This implies that the transition takes the economy
up into the white region in the top row of Figure 10. This suggests, that the stable arm to the steady state is
a path, where either both Q and Nh increases, or they both decrease.
C Parameters
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Path of the relative quality
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Figure 12: Skill premium change source
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Figure 13: Change in the R&D parameters 2
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